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1
On December 15–16, 2011, Harvard Law School convened a conference on
“Political Risk and Public Law”. This special issue of the Journal of Legal
Analysis is devoted to publishing papers on this topic by Jon Elster, Edward
Glaeser, Eric Posner, Fred Schauer, Mark Tushnet, and myself. The overall aim
is to introduce a new set of questions about public law and a new analytical
framework for thinking about those questions.
The premise of the enterprise is that constitutions and other instruments of
public law may fruitfully be viewed as devices for regulating political risks. Large
literatures in law, economics, political science, and policy studies examine
ﬁrst-order risks that arise from technology, the market, or nature. Product
safety laws, workplace safety laws, health and medical regulation, environmen-
tal regulation, emergency management, and other categories of regulatory and
administrative policy-making attempt to manage such risks so as to promote
overall welfare, fair distribution of risk, and other goals. By contrast, it may be
fruitful to understand constitutions and foundational statutes, such as the
Administrative Procedure Act, as devices for regulating second-order risks.
These are risks that arise from the design of institutions, the allocation of
legal and political power among given institutions, and the selection of ofﬁcials
to staff those institutions. Whereas ordinary risk regulation asks how ﬁrst-order
risks should be managed, political risk regulation asks how institutions should
be designed, how competences should be allocated, and how ofﬁcials should be
selected to produce the best attainable constitutional system.
Thedifference between the political risk perspective on public law, on the one
hand, and the familiar legal-process analysis of comparative institutional com-
petence, on the other, is that the former employs the framework of risk analysis
elaborated by many disciplines across the social and policy sciences. That
framework promises new insights for public law. Constitutional actors have
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 often spoken the prose of risk regulation without knowing it, offering argu-
ments about constitutional and institutional design that implicitly posit
second-order risks and offer institutional prescriptions for managing those
risks. By bringing the analytic structure of those arguments to the surface,
political risk analysis promises to allow a more intelligent description and
evaluation of the major problems of public law.
The category of second-order risks is capacious, and the political risks that
principally concern constitutional rulemakers and other actors change over
time. In literatures of development economics, contract law and (to some
extent) constitutional law, one standard sense of “political risk” is narrow:
parties who contract with a government to buy sovereign debt, or who
engage in commercial ventures within a government’s territory, face the risk
that the government will breach its contracts or expropriate investments. Eric
Posner’s paper explains this sense of political risk and examines contractual
mechanisms that parties and governments use to manage such risks. However,
both constitutional actors and analysts have often discussed a broader set of
political risks as well. In the founding era in the USA, the most prominent
political risks posited by Antifederalists involved tyranny, oligarchy or aristoc-
racy, excessive centralization, and other threats to public liberty. By contrast,
Federalists, especially Publius, focused on the risks of military weakness from
excessive decentralization, the instability of unconstrained popular democracy,
and the insecurity of property rights.
In this vein, the conference participants examined a broad range of political
risks. Jon Elster’s paper examines the role of violence and the risk or threat of
violence in the two leading episodes of constitution-making in the late 18th
century, at Philadelphia and at Paris. In the American case, Elster emphasizes
that the risk of armed popular rebellions, such as Shay’s Rebellion, hovered over
the convention and structured some of its most critical decisions—decisions
criticized in turn by Jefferson on the ground that the draft constitution “set[]
up a kite [a hawk] to keep the hen-yard in order”, (this issue, at—) and thereby
created a risk of elite oppression. Edward Glaeser’s paper, an extension of the
public choice literature on the political determinants and consequences of
regulation, focuses on a tradeoff between “the twin political risks of subversion,
where private companies capture policy” and “political favoritism, where
public leaders use government policy to pursue their own pet objectives”
(this issue, at —). Glaeser examines this tradeoff in the setting of three main
classes of market failure—monopoly, externalities, and problems of systemic
risk in the ﬁnancial sector—and details conditions under which laissez-faire
private ownership, regulated private ownership, or public ownership will maxi-
mize welfare, given competing risks of political distortions. Fred Schauer’s
paper examines the political risks of breaking the law, taking the standpoint
2 ~ Vermeule: Political Risk and Public Law
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 of ofﬁcials whose policy preferences are inconsistent (or have some risk of being
inconsistent) with what the law requires or may require. Here there are multiple
political risks, including risks of lawsuits or criminal action against ofﬁcials, and
the risk that where there are no legal sanctions for ofﬁcial lawbreaking, ofﬁcials
will be able to break the law with impunity so long as their actions are politically
popular ex post. Mark Tushnet’s paper addresses free speech doctrine, much of
which focuses on the risk that ofﬁcials will suppress political dissent or other
potentially valuable speech. Like Glaeser, Tushnet observes that law and regu-
lation in the relevant domain are complicated by systematic tradeoffs. As
against the political risk of illicit speech suppression by governments, judicial
review of free speech claims creates political risks of its own, notably the risk
that judges will develop excessively rigid rules and thereby invalidate justiﬁable
regulation of speech.
The tradeoffs central to these papers illustrate that one of the central debates
in the theory of ﬁrst-order risk regulation has a structural analogue in the
history and theory of constitutional design. The debate involves the utility of
“precautionary principles” in the regulation of health, safety, and environmen-
tal risks. Precautionary principles come in many varieties, and are notoriously
slippery, but the common theme is roughly that law and regulatory policy
should create safeguards that attempt to ward off risks or uncertain harms
before they materialize, and should set the burden of proof against risky tech-
nologies, products, or actions (Wiener 2002). Critics of precautionary prin-
ciples have argued that risks may lie on all sides of the issues, so that precautions
may perversely exacerbate the targeted risk or produce collateral risks; where
this is so, precautionary principles may prove self-defeating (see, e.g., Sunstein
2005; Wiener 2002).
Structurally parallel debates are central to the theory of constitutional design.
In the American case, for example, Antifederalists worried about the risk that
standing armies would eventuate in some form of monarchical despotism or
tyranny, and thus proposed stringent constitutional precautions.
2 In rebuttal,
Hamilton (writing as Publius) argued that overly stringent precautions against
standing armies at the national level would risk foreign invasion and domestic
rebellion, possibly leading to greater threats to liberty and property overall—a
perverse consequence of precautions.
3 The papers by Elster, Glaeser, Schauer,
and Tushnet illustrate, in different ways, the major theme of Hamilton’s rebut-
tal and of the modern critiques of precautionary principles: political risks can lie
on all sides of alternative institutional arrangements.
2 See the Antifederalist pamphlets collected in Storing (1981).
3 Federalist No. 8, in Hamilton et al. (1961).
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 Another parallel involves the distinctions among risk, uncertainty and ignor-
ance, a staple of the ﬁrst-order literature. Technically speaking, in decisions
under risk there is both a well-deﬁned set of possible outcomes and probabil-
ities that can be attached to those outcomes; in decisions under uncertainty, no
probabilities can be attached to the possible outcomes; and in decisions under
ignorance, even the range of possible outcomes is itself unknown or ill-deﬁned.
In a larger colloquial sense, however, “risk” can encompass any of these cate-
gories, and one of the major lines of discussion in the risk-regulation literature
is whether to understand particular problems as decisions under risk, uncer-
tainty, or ignorance.
The same issue surfaces repeatedly in constitutional design. Given the bewil-
dering array of causal forces and institutional variables that constitutional rule-
makers have to consider, and the general fog of uncertainty that hovers over
politics conducted on a large scale, certainty is never attainable; the ﬁghting
questions are whether epistemically warranted probabilities can ever sensibly be
attached to the outcomes of constitutional choices, and what the range of
possible outcomes might be. In the founding-era debates, Elster reports, par-
ticipants often attempted to justify constitutional precautions by appealing to
the bare possibility of bad outcomes, without offering any estimate of the
probability of those outcomes—essentially theconservative “maximin”strategy
for decision-making under uncertainty (Luce & Raiffa 1957, 278–282). Other
participants offered risk-based assessments that implicitly posited probability
estimates, although not of course in modern terms.
In addition to the foregoing questions, which the papers illuminate but do
not resolve, the lens of political risk implies a further research agenda for public
law. Here are a few of the relevant questions:
(1) In the ﬁrst-order risk regulation literature, another major discussion
involves the question whether there are systematic cross-national differences
in styles of or approaches to risk management. Very roughly, one position holds
that European democracies are systematically more risk-averse and more pre-
cautionary than is the USA, whereas another position holds that different
polities merely tend to focus on different risks on different margins of policy,
so that no large-scale contrast is possible (Wiener 2010). At the level of
second-order risks, are there systematic differences across polities? Do some
constitutions reﬂect greater concern about private violence, disorder, or capture
of governmental powers by powerful private actors, whereas some reﬂect
greater concern about majoritarian oppression or ofﬁcial tyranny? Is there a
cross-national contrast between robust free speech protection in the USA and
weaker protection in Europe?
(2) Relatedly, what is the role, if any, of “cultural cognition” about
second-order political risk? A burgeoning literature on cultural risk cognition
4 ~ Vermeule: Political Risk and Public Law
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 holds that, as to various ﬁrst-order risks, there are several identiﬁable cultural
styles of risk perception and evaluation, including “hierarchical”, “egalitarian”,
and “communitarian” styles (Kahan & Braman 2006). Conditional on believing
that this literature illuminates ﬁrst-order risk regulation, can it usefully be trans-
posed to the setting of second-order political risks? Are there important cultural
determinants of anxiety about political risks? It has been claimed, for example,
that American political culture repeatedly undergoes bouts of “tyrannophobia”
or widespread public anxiety about the risk of despotism (Posner & Vermeule
2012); it is also sometimes said that American political culture is prone to con-
spiracy theorizing and a “paranoid political style” that tends to exaggerate pol-
itical risks of various sorts (Hofstadter 1964). Do these claims stand up,
historically and theoretically? What do they imply for the design of constitutions,
framework statutes, and other instruments of public law?
(3) Within any given polity, do different institutions or different types of
rulemakers tend to take systematically different approaches to political risk
regulation? Will rules designed by judges, for example, be systematically
more or less precautionary about political risk than rules designed by legisla-
tors, executive ofﬁcials, or independent regulatory agencies and tribunals?
(4) From a normative standpoint, how should institutional designers cope
with conditions of risk, uncertainty, or ignorance? In situations of risk in the
strict sense, in which probabilities can be attached to outcomes, are the tools of
ﬁrst-order cost–beneﬁt analysis useful at the second order? In situations of
genuine uncertainty or ignorance about political risk, what approach should
institutional and constitutional designers take? It has been argued, for example,
that in the USA today there is in some sense a real chance that the imperial
presidency will eventuate in executive despotism or a military coup (Ackerman
2010). Can such risks be quantiﬁed, or the possible harms evaluated? How
could such a claim be shown to be plausible or implausible?
(5) Perhaps the largest set of normative questions arises out of a contrast, in
the history of constitutional and political theory, between two general
approaches to second-order risk regulation. These two approaches might be
called precautionary constitutionalism and optimizing constitutionalism.
4 The
former is exempliﬁed by David Hume’s (1742) knavery principle: the maxim
that “in contriving any system of government, and ﬁxing the several checks and
controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to
havenootherend,inallhisactions, thanprivateinterest”.Inmorerecenttimes,
but in the same spirit, Karl Popper (1985) maintained that the central task of
4 For substantiation of this claim, see Vermeule, Adrian. 2012. Precautionary Principles in
Constitutional Law, [this issue]; Lanni, Adriaan & Adrian Vermeule. Precautionary
Constitutionalism in Ancient Athens, Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming).
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 democratic institutional design is to “organize political institutions [so] that
badorincompetentrulerscanbepreventedfromdoingtoomuchdamage....”.
Under what conditions will this sort of precautionary constitutionalism
prove attractive or unattractive? Is it even coherent, given that risks or uncertain
harms may arise on all sides of the relevant questions of institutional design?
There is no shortage of such questions; this list is merely illustrative, not
exhaustive. If constitutions and framework statutes can fruitfully be viewed as
instruments for regulating political risks, then any of the problems, tools, and
literatures relevant to ordinary risk regulation may have instructive analogies or
disanalogies at the political level. The symposium papers are a ﬁrst step towards
exploring this larger agenda.
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